Proxy advisory …rms have become important players in corporate governance, but the extent of their in ‡uence over shareholder votes is debated. We estimate the e¤ect of Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) recommendations on voting outcomes by exploiting exogenous variation in ISS recommendations generated by a cuto¤ rule in ISS voting guidelines. Using a regression discontinuity design, we …nd that a negative ISS recommendation on a say-on-pay proposal leads to a 25 percentage point reduction in voting support for the proposal, suggesting strong in ‡uence over shareholder votes.
Introduction
Shareholder voting plays a key role in corporate governance. It has become especially important due to the increase in institutional ownership, the rise in shareholder activism, the shift to majority voting for director elections, and the introduction of mandatory say-on-pay. 1 A signi…cant development in recent years has been the growth of proxy advisory …rms. Proxy advisors counsel investors on how to vote their shares on major corporate decisions, such as mergers and acquisitions, director elections, executive compensation, and corporate governance policies. The largest proxy advisor, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), gives recommendations on almost 40,000 companies in 115 countries and has over 1,600 institutional clients.
Over time, regulators and market participants have become increasingly concerned with the in ‡uence proxy advisors allegedly have over investors'votes. According to the SEC commissioner Michael Piwowar at the 2013 SEC roundtable on proxy advisors, "proxy advisory …rms may exercise outsized in ‡uence on shareholder voting" and the 'Dodd-Frank provisions, such as mandatory say-on-pay votes, make proxy advisory …rms potentially even more in ‡uential." The reason why proxy advisors'in ‡uence is potentially concerning is that their recommendations are frequently criticized for inaccuracies, a one-size-…ts-all approach to governance matters, and con ‡icts of interest stemming from the consulting services to corporations. 2 Motivated by these concerns, the SEC has held several discussions about the role of proxy advisors, which resulted in the release of Sta¤ Legal Bulletin No. 20 (SLB 20) in June 2014. The main goal of the bulletin is to provide guidance on investment advisors'use of proxy advisors and on proxy advisors' responsibilities in dealing with con ‡icts of interest. However, many market participants, including the regulators themselves, feel that the guidance provided by SLB 20 is insu¢ cient and that more stringent regulation may be necessary. 3 To understand whether increased regulation is warranted, it is ultimately important to understand the extent of proxy advisors'in ‡uence over shareholder votes. There is disagreement about whether the impact of their recommendations is as strong as is sometimes claimed. On the one hand, 1 Say-on-pay is an advisory vote expressing shareholder approval or disapproval of the …rm's executive compensation practices. The Dodd-Frank Act required almost all US public …rms to provide shareholders with such a vote. 2 See, e.g., "Outsized Power & In ‡uence: The Role of Proxy Advisers" by the SEC commissioner Daniel Gallagher (Gallagher, 2014) and the SEC Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System (July, 2010). 3 For example, the SEC commissioner Daniel Gallagher writes: "While these reforms are much-needed, I am concerned that the guidance does not go far enough" (Gallagher, 2014) . Reforms that have been proposed seek strict regulatory oversight of proxy advisors' voting guidelines and recommendations. They include requiring proxy advisors to …le their recommendations with the SEC, maintain public records of their recommendations, and disclose the data and arguments they use when formulating those recommendations. See, e.g., the October 20, 2010 Shareholder Communications Coalition Letter to the SEC.
regulators' concerns about proxy advisors', and especially ISS's, outsized in ‡uence are consistent with the strong positive correlation observed between ISS recommendations and voting outcomes.
On the other hand, assessing the actual in ‡uence of ISS has been di¢ cult because of the omitted variable problem: the same unobservable …rm and management characteristics that lead ISS to give a negative recommendation can also lead shareholders to withdraw their support for the proposal, leading to an upward bias in the estimates of the ISS e¤ect. This issue has been widely recognized in the academic literature and by many industry participants and has been discussed at the SEC roundtable on proxy advisors in December 2013. Prior literature concludes that ISS recommendations move at least some fraction of the votes, but whether this fraction is large or small remains unclear (e.g., Iliev and Lowry, 2015; Ertimur et al., 2013; and Larcker et al., 2015) . 4 As a result, many observers believe that the in ‡uence of proxy advisors is signi…cantly overstated and hence stringent regulation may do more harm than good (e.g., Edelman, 2013) . 5 Even ISS itself has used this argument to alleviate regulators' concerns about its oversized in ‡uence and prevent further regulation:
"As many investors can be expected to share a general approach to assessing corporate governance practices, it is perhaps not surprising that correlations can be found between ISS recommendations and shareholder voting outcomes. However, this does not prove causality, nor are those correlations consistent. In our view, it is more logical to interpret broad correlation as indicating that ISS policies, analyses and recommendations are based on principles and approaches which are shared by many investors." 6 In this paper, we address this empirical challenge and quantify the causal e¤ect of ISS by exploiting exogenous variation in ISS recommendations due to a cuto¤ rule employed by ISS in its 4 For example, Iliev and Lowry (2015) , Ertimur, Ferri, and Oesch (2013) , and Larcker, McCall, and Ormazabal (2015) show that the sensitivity to ISS recommendations is weaker for shareholders that are larger and have lower turnover, and Ertimur et al. (2015) use this di¤erential sensitivity to put a lower bound on the causal e¤ect of ISS. A detailed review of the literature on proxy advisors is provided below. 5 Industry participants are concerned that regulatory costs would be eventually transferred from proxy advisors onto their clients, which may be prohibitively costly for small institutional investors. In addition, regulation could give proxy advisors a "seal of approval" from the government, thus giving them "undue credibility." Finally, stringent regulation would be especially costly for smaller proxy advisors and new competitors, which could harm competition and strengthen ISS's position as a market leader: ISS controls 61% of the market, the second largest proxy advisor, Glass Lewis, controls 36%, and other proxy advisors have a much smaller market share. See, e.g., Edelman (2013) and the Center on Executive Compensation report "A Call for Change in the Proxy Advisory Industry Status Quo." 6 See ISS (2012) . See also Glass Lewis's response to the European Securities and Markets Authority on June 25, 2012: "The extent to which advisors in ‡uence voting outcomes is overstated... A correlation between PA recommendations and vote outcomes is proof of coincidence, not causality," and BlackRock's comment to the SEC, which states: "We believe that the in ‡uence of proxy advisory …rms in general, and ISS in particular, have been overstated." (www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-10/s71410-254.pdf).
guidelines on say-on-pay proposals. Speci…cally, ISS used to conduct an initial screen of companies focusing on their one-and three-year total shareholder returns (TSRs) relative to certain cuto¤s and only performed a deeper analysis of the company's executive compensation practices for companies below the cuto¤. For example, the ISS 2012 white paper "Evaluating Pay for Performance Alignment" notes: "In the last few years, the approach has utilized a quantitative methodology to identify underperforming companies -i.e., those with both 1-and 3-year total shareholder return (TSR) below the median of peers in their 4-digit Global Industry Classi…cation Standard (GICS) group. Underperforming companies then received an in-depth qualitative review, focused primarily on factors such as the year-over-year change in the CEO's total pay, the 5-year trend in CEO pay versus company TSR, and the strength of performance-based pay elements." More speci…cally, as we discuss in Section 2, the cuto¤ for a given company is calculated as the median TSR of all …rms that are both in the company's four-digit GICS industry group and in Russell 3000, where the TSRs are computed on the last day of the calendar quarter closest to the company's …scal-year-end. In the rest of the paper, we refer to this rule as the ISS "cuto¤ rule."
The ISS cuto¤ rule allows us to use a regression discontinuity (RD) design to estimate the causal e¤ect of ISS recommendations. Speci…cally, the rule implies that …rms below the cuto¤ undergo more scrutiny to get a positive recommendation from ISS than …rms above the cuto¤, and hence the probability of a negative ISS recommendation should increase discontinuously just below the cuto¤.
Indeed, we show that relative to …rms just above the cuto¤, there is a 15% increase (from 10% to 25%) in the probability of a negative recommendation for …rms just below the cuto¤. This jump is large given that the average probability of a negative ISS recommendation in our sample is 12.7%.
At the same time, the somewhat arbitrary nature of the ISS cuto¤ suggests that being just above or below the cuto¤ is locally random, i.e., …rms just above and just below the cuto¤ are similar across all characteristics except, potentially, the ISS recommendation. Thus, any discontinuous decrease in voting support below the cuto¤ can be attributed to the causal e¤ect of ISS recommendations.
We therefore implement a fuzzy RD design by focusing on a narrow bandwidth around the cuto¤ and instrumenting a negative ISS recommendation with an indicator variable that equals one for …rms below the cuto¤ (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Roberts and Whited, 2012) .
Our analysis shows a strong e¤ect of ISS recommendations on voting outcomes and refutes the frequent claim that the in ‡uence of ISS is overstated. Speci…cally, we …nd that relative to positive recommendations, negative ISS recommendations lead to a 25 percentage point decrease in voting support for say-on-pay proposals. This e¤ect is economically signi…cant: dissent above 20% is viewed as an indication of substantial dissatisfaction (e.g., Del Guercio, Seery, and Woidtke, 2008; Ferri and Maber, 2013) and leads companies to change their compensation practices (Ferri and Maber, 2013; Ertimur, Ferri, and Oesch, 2013) . Our main speci…cation is a local linear regression estimated on a 5% bandwidth, and our estimates are robust to multiple bandwidths, using ‡exible polynomial functions, and controlling for various …rm characteristics. We also …nd evidence that the e¤ect of ISS is stronger in …rms with higher institutional ownership and less concentrated institutional ownership, consistent with the hypothesis that larger shareholders have more incentives to do their independent research (e.g., Iliev and Lowry, 2015) .
The key assumption of our RD design is that whether a …rm falls just above or below the cuto¤ is locally random. We perform several tests to verify this assumption and to show that our results are not driven by di¤erences in …rm characteristics around the cuto¤. First, we redo our analysis on two samples for which the cuto¤ rule does not apply: say-on-pay voting in 2012 (the year in which ISS stopped using this rule) and voting for director elections during our main sample period. In both cases, voting support is continuous around the cuto¤, suggesting that the only reason for the discontinuity in votes in our main sample is the corresponding discontinuity in ISS recommendations. Second, we show that the distribution of various elements of CEO compensation and other …rm characteristics is smooth around the cuto¤. Third, we alleviate the concern that …rms manipulate their TSRs to move above the cuto¤ by performing the McCrary (2008) test and showing that the density of the forcing variable is smooth around the cuto¤. Such manipulation is indeed unlikely given that the cuto¤ depends on the TSRs of all …rms in the industry and the TSRs are determined by stock price movements. Finally, we consider several placebo cuto¤s and show no evidence of discontinuity around them.
Our setting also allows us to evaluate the informativeness of ISS recommendations relative to the information that shareholders possess independently. To study this question, we compare our estimates of ISS's in ‡uence to the estimates obtained via OLS. An important concern about the OLS estimates is that ISS recommendations and shareholder votes can be based on the same information, leading to a positive omitted variable bias. For example, large institutional investors, such as Vanguard, BlackRock, and Fidelity, have their own proxy research departments and claim to acquire information independently of ISS. The correlation between such shareholders'votes and ISS recommendations could lead to an upward bias in the OLS estimation. We …nd, however, that the OLS estimates of the ISS e¤ect, both based on our sample and those obtained in prior studies (e.g., Ertimur, Ferri, and Oesch, 2013) , are very close to the 25% e¤ect estimated using the RD approach.
As we show in Section 6, this implies two possibilities. One is that many shareholders indeed perform independent research and have valuable information, but the correlation of ISS recommendations with their information is low, implying that ISS recommendations must be relatively uninformative.
The other possibility is that few shareholders perform independent research, in which case it is di¢ cult to make inferences about the informativeness of ISS recommendations. These conclusions are con…rmed by an additional test, which focuses on …rms with a positive ISS recommendation and compares voters'sensitivity to positive recommendations on the two sides of the cuto¤.
Finally, we discuss the generalizability of our results to a broader sample of …rms and to other time periods. The RD design does not allow us to estimate the causal e¤ect of ISS for …rms away from the cuto¤ and after 2011, when the cuto¤ rule was no longer used, so one should be cautious in extrapolating our estimates to the general e¤ect of ISS recommendations. However, we examine the OLS estimates of the ISS e¤ect and …nd that they are very stable across di¤erent subsamples in 2011 (ranging between 23% and 25%) and over time (ranging between 25% and 29%). Assuming that the omitted variable bias in OLS estimates remains small in these other samples, this suggests that the 25% e¤ect could be generalized to other …rms and to subsequent years.
Related literature
Our paper contributes to the literature on shareholder activism and the role of institutional investors in …rms'corporate governance. 7 In particular, it is related to the literature on shareholder voting.
Prior research shows that shareholder voting has a signi…cant impact on …rms'policies and value, even when votes are nonbinding. 8 In an RD setting, Cuñat, Gine, and Guadalupe (2012, 2014) …nd that relative to proposals that fail by a small margin, proposals that pass by a small margin yield an abnormal return between 1.3% and 2.4%, depending on the proposal type. 9 In the context of say-on-pay voting, Ferri and Maber (2013) show that about 80% of UK …rms with substantial voting dissent respond by removing controversial compensation practices, and Ertimur, Ferri, and Oesch (2013) …nd similar evidence for US …rms. 10 Given the signi…cance of shareholder voting, it is important to understand what factors a¤ect investors'voting decisions. Our paper shows that a major determinant of shareholder votes are the recommendations of proxy advisory …rms.
The literature on proxy advisors documents a signi…cant positive association between ISS recommendations and shareholder support on various voting issues. 11 9 While these papers also use RD in the context of shareholder voting, the approach in our paper is di¤erent since we compare …rms that fall just below and just above the ISS cuto¤. 10 Relatedly, Schwartz-Ziv and Wermers (2015) show that low say-on-pay support is followed by a decrease in excess compensation and better selection of peer …rms when ownership is relatively concentrated. See also Ertimur, Ferri, and Muslu (2011) and Cai and Walkling (2011 12 Speci…cally, these bounds are calculated under the assumptions that (1) all institutional blockholders do their own research and cast votes independently of ISS and (2) all shareholders doing their own research, whether blockholders or nonbockholders, on average reach the same conclusions. In a similar spirit, Choi, Fisch, and Kahan (2010) examine the interaction terms between ISS recommendations and individual and institutional investor holdings. Assuming that voting of individual investors is a perfect proxy for how institutional investors would vote if ISS did not exist, they conclude that the causal e¤ect of ISS is between 6% and 10%.
Methodology
A positive correlation between shareholder support and ISS recommendations does not imply that ISS has a causal e¤ect on voting outcomes because of omitted variables that could a¤ect both ISS recommendations and shareholder votes. In this section, we discuss how we address this identi…ca-tion issue through a regression discontinuity design.
The source of exogenous variation in ISS recommendations is the following cuto¤ rule used by ISS in 2010 and 2011. When giving recommendations on say-on-pay proposals, ISS used to …rst screen companies based on their TSRs and focused its e¤orts on "underperforming" …rms. Speci…cally, ISS identi…ed a company as "underperforming"if both its one-and three-year TSRs were below the respective median TSRs of other …rms in the company's four-digit GICS group, where the TSRs were calculated on the last day of the calendar quarter closest to the company's …scal-year-end. Note also that ISS only included Russell 3000 …rms in its de…nition of the company's four-digit GICS group. 13 After identifying the "underperforming" companies using these cuto¤s, ISS conducted an in-depth qualitative review of their compensation practices before giving a say-on-pay recommendation. 14 This rule suggests that ISS is likely to give a positive say-on-pay recommendation without conducting deep analysis if the …rm is not identi…ed as "underperforming,"but will carefully scrutinize the …rm's compensation practices (pay-performance alignment, the strength of performance-based elements, pay relative to peers, quality of disclosures, and other issues) before giving it a positive recommendation if the …rm is "underperforming." 15 As we show in Section 4.1, this leads to a discrete jump in the probability of a negative recommendation for "underperforming" …rms. We therefore implement a fuzzy RD design by instrumenting a negative ISS recommendation with an indicator variable BelowCuto¤ , which equals one if the …rm's one-and three-year TSRs both fall 13 See, e.g., the "2011 U.S. Proxy Voting Guidelines Summary"white paper and the "Financial Highlights Data Overview," which says "The GICS Sector TSR displayed for US companies is the median TSR for companies in the same 4-digit GICS group and Russell 3000 index membership -i.e., for a company included in the Russell 3000 index, sector peers will be drawn only from the Russell 3000 index." 14 See "Evaluating Pay for Performance Alignment ISS'Quantitative and Qualitative Approach," Feb 17, 2012. See also page 38 of the "2011 U.S. Proxy Voting Guidelines Summary" and pages 37-38 of the "2010 SRI U.S. Proxy Voting Guidelines" for descriptions of the same rule. 15 The rule does not imply that ISS always gives a positive recommendation to a …rm above the cuto¤. Indeed, in addition to the above methodology, ISS checks for three key "problematic pay practices" that, according to its guidelines, can lead to a negative recommendation on a stand-alone basis: "single-trigger" or "modi…ed single-trigger"provisions in severance contracts, "tax gross-ups,"and repricing of stock options without shareholder approval (e.g., the ISS "2011 U.S. Proxy Voting Guidelines Summary"and Pearl Meyer & Partners "Client Alert: ISS Issues Policy Updates and FAQs for 2011 Proxy Season".) This policy is consistent with our …ndings: to understand the ISS methodology better, we examine the corresponding (2010 or 2011) proxy statements of the 78 …rms that received a negative ISS recommendation despite being above the cuto¤ and …nd that more than 90% of these …rms had at least one of these three pay practices. below their respective industry medians, and zero otherwise (see Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Roberts and Whited (2012) for reviews of the fuzzy RD methodology.) Formally, for …rm i in year t, BelowCuto¤ it is given by
where M axT SR is the forcing variable, measured in percentage points and de…ned as
it is the n-year TSR of …rm i computed in year t, and M edianT SR (n) it is the median n-year TSR in year t computed across all Russell 3000 …rms in the same four-digit GICS group as …rm i.
We describe the calculation of the TSRs in Section 3.
The identi…cation assumption is local continuity, which implies that …rms around the cuto¤ are comparable, so that the relation between voting support and the variable M axT SR would be smooth around the cuto¤ in the absence of di¤erential ISS recommendations. This assumption is plausible because the cuto¤ used by ISS is somewhat arbitrary. First, it is based on the TSRs of a speci…c group of …rms (those that are both in Russell 3000 and in the …rm's four-digit GICS group), 16 and second, the TSRs are calculated on a speci…c date (the last day of the quarter closest to the …rm's …scal-year end). We formally test this identi…cation assumption in Sections 5.1-5.3.
To identify the causal e¤ect of ISS recommendations on voting outcomes, we conduct the twostage least squares (2SLS) procedure by estimating the following two-equation system. The …rst (second) equation corresponds to the …rst (second) stage: Our main speci…cation is a local linear regression, i.e., f i and g i are linear functions estimated on a small bandwidth around the cuto¤ (we show the robustness to including higher-order polynomials in Table 6 ). In particular, we estimate
Following the suggestion in Imbens and Lemieux (2008), we focus on the rectangular kernel and verify the robustness of the results to di¤erent bandwidths. In model 1 of Tables 2 and 3 , we set 3 and 3 to zero, thus restricting the slope of the linear regression to be the same on the two sides of the cuto¤. In models 2-5, we allow 3 and 3 to be di¤erent from zero, thus allowing for di¤erent slopes on the two sides of the cuto¤.
Note that as long as the covariates are continuous around the cuto¤ (the assumption that we verify for various …rm characteristics in Section 5.2), fuzzy RD design does not require the inclusion of control variables other than the forcing variable to produce consistent estimates (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008) . Nevertheless, we include several …rm characteristics that may a¤ect voting support for say-on-pay proposals, such as characteristics of the CEO compensation package, the …rm's ownership structure, and other …rm characteristics, as well as year and industry …xed e¤ects, and show the robustness of our results.
We estimate the above equations on a narrow bandwidth around the cuto¤, i.e., we only include observations that satisfy h < M axT SR < h, where h is the bandwidth. Following the practical considerations in Imbens and Lemieux (2008), we use the same bandwidth for the …rst-and secondstage regressions. The tradeo¤ in choosing the bandwidth is that a larger bandwidth increases precision by including more observations, but also introduces an additional bias. In our main analysis, we use a bandwidth of 5%. In Table 6 , we repeat the analysis on many alternative bandwidths and show that our estimates are robust to the choice of the bandwidth. In addition, we apply the cross-validation procedure that is commonly used in the literature to determine the optimal bandwidth. The details of this procedure are outlined in Appendix C. The cross-validation procedure yields the optimal bandwidth between 4% and 5%, consistent with our baseline bandwidth of 5%.
Data and variable construction
The data on ISS recommendations and voting outcomes come from the ISS Voting Analytics database, which covers Russell 3000 …rms. For each …rm and each proposal on the agenda, the database provides the percentage of votes for, votes against, and abstentions, whether the proposal passed or failed, and the ISS recommendation on the proposal. There is variation across …rms in the way voting support is calculated. While the numerator is always the number of votes in favor of the proposal, the denominator, captured by the variable "base," is di¤erent across …rms. Base can be the sum of the votes in favor and against the proposal (51.83% of the sample), the sum of the votes in favor and against the proposal plus the number of abstentions (47.77% of the sample), or the total number of shares outstanding (0.40% of the sample). We use the appropriate denominator to calculate Votes, the percentage voting support for each company. We focus on observations for which both the voting support and the ISS recommendation are observed.
We obtain the data on TSRs and …rm characteristics from Compustat, the data on institutional ownership from Thomson Reuters 13F, and the data on executive compensation and insider ownership from GMI Ratings (formerly Corporate Library). 17 We …rst match the ISS sample to
Compustat and CRSP by ticker and company name. 18 We then merge the sample with GMI Ratings by ticker and name, and with Thomson Reuters 13F by CUSIP, name, and ticker. Appendix prior years because say-on-pay proposals were relatively rare before 2011, when they were made mandatory by the Dodd-Frank Act. 19 We also do not include 2012 because, as discussed in Section 5.3, ISS stopped using its cuto¤ rule that year. Instead, we use the observations from 2012 (as well as the sample of director elections) as a falsi…cation test to show the validity of our RD setting. 17 We use GMI Ratings and not Execucomp because Execucomp only tracks executive compensation in S&P 1500 …rms, while our sample covers Russell 3000 …rms. 18 We conduct two rounds of matching to ensure that the match is correct. The …rst approach is to merge the data with Compustat to obtain GVKEY (and CUSIP) and then merge with the CRSP/COMPUSTAT Merged link table to get PERMNO (and CUSIP). The second approach is to …rst merge the data with the stock names …le from CRSP to get PERMNO, and then merge with the link table to obtain GVKEY. We cross-check the observations after the two rounds of matching. 19 There were only 404 say-on-pay proposals during the 2005-2009 period, compared to 2,020 say-on-pay proposals in 2010-2011.
Constructing the TSR cuto¤s
According to the ISS guidelines, "ISS utilizes S&P's Compustat database for TSR calculated values. The Total Return concepts are annualized rates of return re ‡ecting price appreciation plus reinvestment of dividends (calculated monthly) and the compounding e¤ect of dividends paid on reinvested dividends."We therefore also use Compustat's Total Return concept to calculate TSRs.
In particular, we multiply the current month's adjusted close price by the current month's Total Return Factor provided by Compustat, divide the result by the product of the adjusted close price multiplied by the Total Return Factor from the prior period (one or three prior years for T SR (1) and T SR (3) , respectively), and annualize the three-year return. The Total Return Factor is a multiplication factor that re ‡ects monthly price appreciation and reinvestment of monthly dividends and cash equivalent distributions and the compounding e¤ect of dividends paid on reinvested dividends.
The TSR cuto¤ for each …rm is calculated as the median TSR of Russell 3000 …rms in the same four-digit GICS industry. 20 ISS guidelines specify the following dates to compute TSRs. TSRs are downloaded at the end of each calendar quarter, i.e., on the last day of March, June, September, and December. For a given …rm and year, the relevant download date is the last day of the calendar quarter closest to the …scal-year end of the subject …rm. For example, if a …rm's …scal-year-end is March 31, TSRs for …rms in the same industry group are calculated on March 31. 21 Besides manually calculating the median industry TSRs, we obtain the list of median TSRs from the ISS website. For example, Appendix B presents a screenshot of the webpage with median TSRs for each four-digit GICS industry downloaded at the end of the four most recent calendar quarters. We obtain similar tables for most periods in our sample and …nd that they mostly match our manually calculated cuto¤s. Because the medians from the ISS website capture the cuto¤s used by ISS more precisely, we use these medians for all quarters for which they are available on the ISS website and use our manually-calculated medians for the remaining quarters. For robustness, we have repeated the analysis using the manually-calculated medians for all quarters and obtained similar results.
ISS guidelines do not specify whether a given …rm's TSR, which is compared to the industry median cuto¤, is downloaded on the …rm's …scal-year-end date or, similarly to the corresponding industry median, at the end of the calendar quarter closest to its …scal-year-end. 22 The two ap- 20 The list of Russell 3000 …rms was obtained from Bloomberg. 21 See, e.g., the guidelines on the ISS website, which say "ISS downloads TSR performance data at the end of March, June, September, and December for each of the four-digit industry GICS groups to determine the median applicable for Russell 3000 companies. Given that executive compensation is reported on a …scal year basis, and that …scal year ends vary by company, the applicable list will depend on the closest TSR performance download where a company's …scal year falls."This methodology was also con…rmed in authors' communication with ISS representatives. 22 ISS uses TSRs downloaded on the …rm's …scal-year-end date for some of its other recommendations, such proaches coincide for …rms whose …scal-year-end falls on the end of the calendar quarter, which constitute 90% of the sample. To follow the ISS methodology precisely, we restrict our sample to these 90% of …rms. We also note that regardless of the company's TSRs, ISS always gives it a positive say-on-pay recommendation if the total dollar value of CEO compensation is su¢ ciently small, in particular, below the …fth percentile of …rms in that year. This implies that the fuzzy RD setting is not directly applicable for this group of …rms, so we restrict our sample to observations with the total value of CEO compensation above the …fth percentile in that year. Our results are very close if we keep these observations, and the only di¤erence is that at the …rst stage, the discontinuity in the probability of a negative ISS recommendation around the cuto¤ is slightly smaller.
Descriptive statistics
Our …nal sample covers 1,932 …rms and 2,020 say-on-pay proposals in 2010 and 2011: 106 in 2010, and 1,914 in 2011, when say-on-pay became mandatory for a large number of …rms. 23 Panel A of Table 1 [ TABLE 1 HERE] as evaluating pay-for-performance alignment. See, e.g., "Evaluating Pay for Performance Alignment." 23 The fact that say-on-pay proposals were not mandatory in 2010 does not a¤ect our methodology: the factors that led a say-on-pay proposal to be included in the agenda do not invalidate the RD design as long as they are continuous around the cuto¤.
E¤ect of ISS on voting outcomes
We …rst present the graphical analysis and then the results of the 2SLS estimation. In a fuzzy RD design, the estimate of the causal e¤ect of treatment is the ratio of the two di¤erences, i.e., the di¤erence in expected outcomes around the cuto¤ divided by the di¤erence in the probability of treatment around the cuto¤. Hence, our rough estimate of the causal e¤ect of ISS based on the graphical analysis is 5% 20% , or 25 percentage points. In the next subsections, we formally estimate these discontinuities and the causal e¤ect of ISS by conducting the 2SLS analysis in a narrow bandwidth around the cuto¤.
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
Discontinuity of ISS recommendations around the cuto¤
We start by formally showing that the probability of a negative ISS recommendation increases discontinuously when a …rm's one-and three-year TSRs fall below the industry median TSRs. Table 2 reports the results of the …rst-stage regression for several speci…cations estimated on a 5% bandwidth around the cuto¤. The 5% bandwidth contains 403 observations, with 175 of them corresponding to …rms below the cuto¤. Model 1 restricts the slope of the linear control function to be the same on both sides of the cuto¤, while models 2-5 allow for di¤erent slopes around the cuto¤ by including the interaction term BelowCuto¤ M axT SR. Model 3 extends model 2 by adding year and industry …xed e¤ects. 24 In models 4 and 5, we add additional control variables that have been used in the literature on say-on-pay and proxy advisors (e.g., Ertimur, Ferri, and Oesch, 2013) . Speci…cally, in model 4, we control for corporate governance characteristics that are likely to a¤ect ISS recommendations and voting support on say-on-pay. They include various characteristics of the executive compensation package (the total dollar value of executive compensation, the growth in executive compensation from the previous year, and the proportion of stock-based compensation de…ned as the proportion of total value coming from stock and option awards), as well as the percentage of institutional and insider ownership. 25 In addition, in model 5, we control for other …rm characteristics such as …rm size (measured as the logarithm of the market value of equity), return on assets (ROA), and market-to-book ratio. In all speci…cations, the coe¢ cient on BelowCuto¤ is about 0.15, i.e., the probability of a negative ISS recommendation for …rms just below the cuto¤ is by 15 percentage points higher than for …rms just above the cuto¤. This e¤ect is consistent with the visual estimate from Figure 1(a) . The test for comparing coe¢ cients between the models (Clogg, 1995) con…rms that the coe¢ cients on BelowCuto¤ across all speci…cations are not statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from each other. In unreported results, we also estimate the probit model for the …rst-stage regression. The marginal e¤ect of the coe¢ cient on BelowCuto¤ is 0.131, which is consistent with the estimates from the linear probability model.
[ 
E¤ect of ISS recommendations on voting support
Using the discontinuity in ISS recommendations as an instrument, we next analyze the e¤ect of ISS on voting outcomes. Table 3 presents the results of the second-stage regression. The outcome variable is Votes, measured in percentage points, and the main variable of interest is NegRec, the indicator of a negative ISS recommendation. We estimate several speci…cations corresponding to those in Table 2 . In particular, we control for year and industry …xed e¤ects in models 3-5 and for governance and other …rm characteristics in models 4-5. Importantly, our estimates are not biased by any omitted variables as long as these variables are continuous around the cuto¤.
In models 1 and 2, the coe¢ cient on NegRec is about -25 and is signi…cant at the 5% level, suggesting that relative to a positive recommendation, a negative ISS recommendation reduces the percentage of votes in favor of a say-on-pay proposal by 25 percentage points. As expected under the identi…cation assumption, the e¤ect is quantitatively similar and remains signi…cant once we include year and industry …xed e¤ects and other control variables: the coe¢ cient on NegRec in model 5 is -26.6 and is signi…cant at the 5% level. In Section 5.4, we verify the robustness of this e¤ect to the choice of the bandwidth and the inclusion of higher-order polynomial controls.
It is instructive to compare the RD coe¢ cients on NegRec to the coe¢ cients from the corresponding OLS regressions of Votes on NegRec. We present the OLS estimates, standard errors, and the p-values of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for equality of the OLS and IV estimates in the last three rows of Table 3 . Interestingly, the OLS estimates are very close to the RD estimates: the OLS estimate is about 25 percentage points across all speci…cations, which is consistent with prior …ndings in Ertimur, Ferri, and Oesch (2013) for say-on-pay proposals during the same time period.
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test does not reject the hypothesis that the two estimates are equal. We discuss the implications of this …nding in Section 6 below.
[TABLE 3 HERE]
The 25% e¤ect is economically important. Indeed, practitioners and prior academic studies consider voting dissent of above 20% to be an indication of strong shareholder dissatisfaction (e.g., Del Guercio, Seery, and Woidtke (2008), Ferri and Maber (2013) ). According to a 2011 investor survey, 72% of investor respondents believe that voting dissent above 30% warrants an explicit response from the board regarding improvements in pay practices, and 20% is the most commonly cited dissent level that should trigger such a response (see "2011-2012 Policy Survey Summary of Results" by ISS). Accordingly, say-on-pay dissent above 20%-30% prompts most …rms to change their compensation policies. Ferri and Maber (2013) examine UK …rms' responses to say-on-pay votes and show that about 80% of …rms with more than 20% voting dissent remove controversial pay practices, such as generous severance contracts and problematic performance-based vesting conditions in equity grants. Similarly, Ertimur, Ferri, and Oesch (2013) …nd that more than 70% of US …rms with at least 30% voting dissent change their compensation policies following the vote.
Schwartz-Ziv and Wermers (2015) …nd that companies with low say-on-pay support are likely to decrease excessive compensation and pick peer …rms that more closely resemble their own company when ownership is concentrated. 26 Why do …rms respond to low say-on-pay support? In the past, low support levels, and especially failed say-on-pay votes, have led to shareholder lawsuits, negative 26 See also "At Annual Meetings, 70 Is the New 50, Study Shows," the Wall Street Journal, March 2015. media attention, and damage to …rms'reputation. In its guidelines, ISS notes that if a company fails to "adequately respond to the company's previous say-on-pay proposal that received the support of less than 70 percent of votes cast," ISS may recommend to vote against the members of the compensation committee and potentially the full board, and Glass Lewis places extra scrutiny on …rms with less than 75% approval. These consequences, together with the in ‡uence of ISS on voting outcomes that we document in this paper, suggest that proxy advisors play an important role in …rms'governance practices.
Variation in the e¤ect of ISS across …rms
The 25% estimate captures the impact of ISS on aggregate shareholder support and does not distinguish between di¤erent types of shareholders. ISS recommendations are likely to have a stronger e¤ect on institutional investors, who are the main clients of ISS. In addition, ISS recommendations are likely to have a stronger e¤ect on smaller institutions, which do not hold a concentrated stake in the …rm. This is because institutions with a concentrated stake have stronger incentives to perform independent research. In this section, we present evidence consistent with these hypotheses by studying how the impact of ISS varies across …rms. In particular, we examine the impact of ISS depending on the level of institutional ownership and the degree of institutional ownership concentration. Of course, because the …rm's ownership structure is determined endogenously, we should be cautious about the interpretation of the cross-sectional results in this section.
To study the e¤ect of institutional ownership, we restrict the sample to observations in a bandwidth around the cuto¤ and calculate the median institutional ownership in the resulting sample.
We next divide this sample into two subsamples, based on whether institutional ownership falls below or above the median, and refer to the …rst (second) subsample as the subsample of …rms with "low (high) institutional ownership." We then repeat the RD analysis in Sections 4.1-4.2 on each of the two subsamples. Because the sample size drops twice when we cut the sample into these subsamples, we focus on a 10% bandwidth to avoid losing power and to keep the size of each subsample similar to the sample size in our main tests. The results of the estimation are presented in model 1 of Table 4 . The coe¢ cient on NegRec in the second stage is -24.1 and -32.3 for the low and high institutional ownership subsamples, respectively. Thus, the magnitude of the coe¢ cients is consistent with the hypothesis that the e¤ect of ISS is stronger in …rms with higher institutional ownership, although the formal test cannot reject the hypothesis that the two coe¢ cients are equal.
We next examine institutional ownership concentration by looking at the institutional ownership Her…ndahl-Hirschman index, de…ned as the sum of squared share ownership over all institutional investors. As before, we divide the sample into subsamples depending on whether ownership con-centration is above or below the sample median and conduct the analysis separately on the two subsamples. Models 2 and 3 of Table 4 present results for two speci…cations, not controlling and controlling for the level of institutional ownership, respectively. As expected, the impact of ISS on voting outcomes is stronger when institutional ownership is less concentrated, although the di¤er-ence in coe¢ cients is not signi…cant. These results are in line with the …ndings of Ertimur, Ferri, and Oesch (2013) and Iliev and Lowry (2015) .
[TABLE 4 HERE] 5 Validity of the RD design and robustness
In this section, we perform several tests aimed to show the validity of our RD setting and the robustness of the results.
No manipulation of the forcing variable
Our approach relies on the assumption that …rms are randomly assigned to treatment, i.e., being just above or just below the cuto¤ is random. In particular, we assume that …rms cannot manipulate their TSRs in a way that pushes them just above the cuto¤. This assumption is plausible: …rst, it is not that easy for a company to manipulate its TSR on a speci…c date given that it depends on stock price movements. Moreover, the TSR cuto¤ for a given …rm is a function of TSRs of all other …rms in the industry, which is di¢ cult to predict.
To verify the assumption of no manipulation formally, we perform the procedure proposed by McCrary (2008) , which tests for a discontinuity in the density of the forcing variable M axT SR around the cuto¤. Figure 2 plots the estimated density of M axT SR in a 5% bandwidth around the cuto¤ and shows that the distribution is smooth. The absolute value of the McCrary test statistic for the 5% bandwidth is 0.84, which is not statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at any conventional level. 27 Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the density of the forcing variable is smooth around the cuto¤, suggesting that …rms do not manipulate their TSRs to move above the cuto¤.
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 27 Both the …gure and the McCrary test statistic were generated using the code provided by J. McCrary on his website: http://eml.berkeley.edu/~jmccrary/DCdensity/.
Continuity of covariates
To further test the assumption of random assignment to treatment, we compare the distribution of various ex-ante …rm characteristics just above and just below the cuto¤. Under the null hypothesis of random assignment, the distribution of characteristics una¤ected by ISS recommendations should be smooth around the cuto¤. We look both at general …rm characteristics, such as size, market-tobook ratio, ROA, leverage, institutional and insider ownership, and at various characteristics of the executive compensation package, such as the total value of executive compensation, its percentile in the industry, its growth over the previous year and over the previous three years, and several measures of its pay-performance sensitivity. 28 By analyzing executive compensation characteristics, we can also examine whether …rms below the cuto¤ are more likely to pre-emptively change their executive compensation policies if they realize that they face a higher probability of an in-depth ISS review (e.g., Larcker, McCall, and Ormazabal, 2015).
We perform two sets of tests. First, we perform the RD analysis using each …rm characteristic as the outcome variable. Speci…cally, we regress each characteristic on BelowCuto¤ , M axT SR, BelowCuto¤ M axT SR, and year and industry …xed e¤ects using a 5% bandwidth around the cuto¤. The estimated coe¢ cient and the standard error on the variable BelowCuto¤ are reported in the second column of Table 5 . The table shows that BelowCuto¤ is not statistically signi…cant for any characteristic, consistent with the distribution being smooth around the cuto¤. We also repeat the graphical analysis similar to Figure 1 for each of these characteristics and do not …nd any evidence of discontinuity either (these …gures are omitted for brevity).
Second, we compare the average value of each …rm characteristic in two narrow intervals around the cuto¤: 5% < M axT SR < 0 and 0 < M axT SR < 5%. The results are summarized in Table 5 . Finally, in unreported results, we verify that there is no discontinuity in the recommendations of Glass Lewis around the cuto¤. Thus, our estimates should be attributed to the causal e¤ect of ISS, rather than to the combined e¤ect of both proxy advisory …rms.
[ TABLE 5 HERE] 28 Table E.3 in Appendix E repeats these tests for several additional …rm and executive compensation characteristics.
Tests on alternative samples and placebo cuto¤s
We further con…rm the validity of our RD setting by repeating the analysis on two di¤erent samples.
In particular, instead of looking at say-on-pay proposals in 2010-2011, which is our main sample, we study say-on-pay proposals in 2012 and director elections. (Other types of proposals are much less common and hence do not provide enough observations in a narrow bandwidth around the cuto¤.) The rationale for these falsi…cation tests is that the ISS cuto¤ rule does not apply to these two samples. Indeed, in 2012, ISS signi…cantly changed its say-on-pay guidelines and, among other things, stopped using its 2010-2011 cuto¤ methodology. 29 We formally verify this by estimating the …rst-stage regression on the 2012 sample and showing that the coe¢ cient on BelowCuto¤ is insigni…cant (see Table E .1 in Appendix E). Similarly, the …rst-stage regression on the sample of director elections in Table E .2 of Appendix E shows that the cuto¤ rule does not a¤ect ISS recommendations on director elections either. 30 Thus, if our identi…cation is valid and being above or below the cuto¤ only a¤ects 2010-2011 say-on-pay voting outcomes through ISS recommendations, then voting outcomes for say-on-pay proposals in 2012 and director elections should not exhibit any discontinuity around the cuto¤.
Moreover, when examining director elections, we restrict attention to 2010-2011 and to those …rms in each year that had a say-on-pay proposal in that year and hence are included in the main sample.
By restricting the sample this way, we ensure that our main sample of say-on-pay proposals in 2010-2011 and the sample of director elections contain the same …rms at the same points in time. Hence, continuity of voting outcomes in the second sample provides strong evidence that our RD design is valid.
Figures 3a and 3b present the graphical analysis and show that in both samples, voting support is smooth around the cuto¤. The results of the regression analysis con…rm the absence of discontinuity in votes at any conventional level of signi…cance and are omitted for brevity. 29 For example, after discussing the cuto¤ rule used in 2010-2011, the ISS 2012 white paper "Evaluating Pay for Performance Alignment" notes: "This year, ... ISS decided to re…ne our approach to pay-forperformance evaluations and develop a more sophisticated methodology to drive the quantitative component of the analysis."The 2012 methodology is also aimed to screen …rms before conducting an in-depth qualitative review, but the new screening rule does not allow us to perform the RD analysis for two reasons. First, the comparison group now consists of 14-24 …rms separately chosen by ISS for each company, which are not known to us. Second, the new screening is based on several characteristics of the compensation package (CEO's pay rank within a peer group, the multiple of the CEO's pay relative to the peer group, and the …ve-year trend in CEO pay), which are easily manipulable by companies. 30 Because each …rm has many directors but only one say-on-pay proposal, we aggregate the director elections observations by …rm-year-recommendation to make the sample of director elections consistent with our main sample. In particular, for each …rm and year, we take all directors who received a positive (negative) recommendation from ISS and calculate the average proportion of votes in favor of these directors.
[FIGURE 3 HERE]
Finally, we repeat the analysis on our original sample of say-on-pay proposals in 2010-2011, but using several placebo cuto¤s: M axT SR = c for c 2 f 3%; 3%; 5%; 5%g. For each c, we …rst verify that ISS recommendations exhibit no discontinuity around the cuto¤ M axT SR = c (these results are omitted for brevity) and then repeat the graphical analysis of Figure 1(b) but on the interval c 5% < M axT SR < c + 5%. The results, presented in Figure 4 , show no discontinuity in voting support around these placebo cuto¤s.
[FIGURE 4 HERE]
Robustness tests
In this section, we show the robustness of our main results in Tables 2 and 3 to alternative bandwidths and speci…cations. Table 6 presents the summary of these results. The …rst two rows in each panel present the estimate and standard error of the coe¢ cient on BelowCuto¤ in the …rst-stage regression, and the third and fourth rows present the estimate and standard error of the coe¢ cient on NegRec in the second-stage regression. Tables 2 and 3 on bandwidths ranging between 3% and 20%. 31 The results for both the …rst and second stages are quantitatively similar across bandwidths. In addition, we calculate the optimal bandwidth using the cross-validation procedure described in Appendix C. We …nd that the optimal bandwidth is between 4% and 5%, supporting our choice of 5% for the baseline analysis.
Columns 1-9 of the table present the analysis of model 3 in
An alternative to estimating a local linear regression on a narrow bandwidth is to use a larger sample but include higher-order polynomials of the forcing variable (e.g., Roberts and Whited, 2012). In columns 10-12 of Table 6 , we estimate regressions with di¤erent degree polynomials of M axT SR on a 20% bandwidth, allowing for di¤erent functional forms on the two sides of the cuto¤.
For example, the regressors in column 10 for the second-order polynomial include BelowCuto¤ , M axT SR, M axT SR 2 , BelowCuto¤ M axT SR, BelowCuto¤ M axT SR 2 , and year and industry …xed e¤ects. The table shows that using higher-order polynomials does not a¤ect our estimates.
[TABLE 6 HERE] 31 The results for other speci…cations are similar and are omitted for brevity.
External validity
In this section, we discuss whether we can extrapolate our …ndings to the general e¤ect of ISS recommendations.
While the RD design has strong internal validity, its external validity is usually limited because the estimation is based on a narrow bandwidth around the cuto¤. Unfortunately, our empirical design does not allow us to estimate the causal e¤ect of ISS for …rms away from the cuto¤. We can, however, check whether the OLS estimate of the ISS e¤ect is stable across various subsamples.
Imbens and Lemieux (2008) point out that if the RD and OLS estimates are close, and if the OLS estimates are relatively stable across subsamples, one would be more con…dent in both sets of estimates. This is exactly what we observe in the data: as demonstrated in Table 3 , our estimate of the causal e¤ect of ISS recommendations is very close to the OLS estimates of this e¤ect. In addition, Panel A of Table 7 shows that the OLS estimate is, in turn, very stable: it varies between 23% and 25% across various subsamples around the cuto¤, to the left and to the right of the cuto¤, and the entire sample. As long as the OLS estimate remains close to the causal e¤ect of ISS in other parts of the sample, this suggests that our results are generalizable to the rest of the sample.
Another way to examine the generalizability of our results is to compare …rms around the cuto¤ to those farther from the cuto¤. Because, by construction, the cuto¤ for a given …rm is calculated as the median TSR of the …rm's industry, each …rm close to the cuto¤ has similar stock performance to a median industry …rm, and hence the sample of …rms in a narrow bandwidth around the cuto¤ is likely to be representative of the whole sample of …rms. To check this conjecture, Panel B of Table 7 compares the distribution of various ex-ante …rm characteristics for observations in the 5% bandwidth and for the overall sample. It shows that …rms around the cuto¤ are similar to an average sample …rm across several characteristics, including their operating performance, leverage, institutional ownership and ownership concentration, the proportion of stock-based compensation, and the growth in compensation from the previous year. There are some systematic di¤erences as well: …rms around the cuto¤ are on average larger (and, accordingly, have a higher absolute level of executive compensation) and have lower market-to-book ratios. To understand how the di¤erences in these characteristics could a¤ect the results, we repeat the cross-sectional RD analysis of Section 4.2.1 on our main sample, but for market-to-book and …rm size, rather than for ownership characteristics. In particular, we divide the 10% bandwidth sample into two subsamples, based on whether market-to-book (…rm size) falls below or above the median, and repeat the 2SLS procedure on the two subsamples. The results, presented in Panel C of Table 7 , show that the e¤ect of ISS is slightly stronger for …rms that are larger and have higher market-to-book ratios, but the di¤erences are not statistically signi…cant. Hence, the impact of ISS on an average …rm in the sample could be slightly higher than 25% based on the M/B criterion, and slightly lower based on the size criterion, but the net e¤ect of these two factors is unclear. Importantly, the impact of ISS is at least 24.6% in each of the subsamples of Panel C, suggesting that the 25% estimate is unlikely to signi…cantly underestimate the in ‡uence of ISS for an average …rm. Nevertheless, these di¤erences need to be taken into account when extrapolating our estimates to a broader sample of …rms.
[TABLE 7 HERE]
It is also important to understand whether the results can be generalized to other time periods.
The majority of our sample is in 2011, which is the …rst year when say-on-pay votes became mandatory. Because of that, shareholders'and ISS views on say-on-pay proposals and shareholders' sensitivity to ISS recommendations could potentially change in subsequent years, when say-on-pay became a more routine issue. While we cannot repeat the RD analysis after 2011 because ISS stopped using its cuto¤ methodology, we can again analyze the OLS estimates of the ISS e¤ect after 2011. In addition, we can examine other characteristics of say-on-pay voting to see whether there were important structural changes after 2011. Table 8 [ TABLE 8 HERE] Finally, note that our estimate of 25% should be interpreted as the average proportion of sayon-pay votes moved by ISS, rather than the proportion of uninformed passive shareholders who always follow ISS across all …rms and proposals. In other words, a given shareholder could choose to follow ISS in certain …rms, but could also choose to have a more active voting strategy in other …rms that he knows better or for other proposals that he feels strongly about. Thus, the 25% of say-on-pay votes moved by ISS recommendations are not necessarily all coming from passive voters, who blindly follow ISS in all situations.
Implications for the informational role of ISS
Given the strong e¤ect of ISS recommendations on voting outcomes, it is important to understand how informative these recommendations are for …rms'shareholders. Proxy advisors are frequently criticized for basing their recommendations on materially false or inaccurate information and for following a one-size-…ts-all approach to governance issues, without taking into account the speci…cs of the company (e.g., Gallagher, 2014) .
To examine the informational role of ISS recommendations, it is instructive to compare our estimates of the ISS e¤ect to the estimates obtained from the OLS analysis. As we show in Section ISS recommendations could then act as a coordination device or as protection from legal liability, giving shareholders stronger incentives to follow them. 33 Thus, our …nding of a large causal e¤ect 1 does not by itself allow us to draw conclusions about ISS's informational role: 1 could be high even if the recommendations of ISS are not very informative. However, additional inferences can 32 For example, let the value of the proposal be V , and suppose that V N (0; 1 ), Signal SH = V +" SH , and Signal ISS = V +" ISS , where " i N (0; increases with the precision of the signal i . 33 For example, the 2003 SEC rule, which requires mutual funds to vote in their clients' best interests, explicitly states that an institution "could demonstrate that the vote was not a product of a con ‡ict of interest if it voted client securities in accordance with a pre-determined policy, based upon the recommendations of an independent third party" ("Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers," SEC Release No. IA-2106.) be made from comparing 1 to its OLS estimate.
Because the shareholder's signal is unobserved by the econometrician, it is omitted from the OLS regression Vote = 0;OLS + 1;OLS NegRec + u. The omitted variable bias formula (e.g., Roberts and Whited, 2012) implies that the OLS estimate converges to If the omitted variable bias in the OLS estimate is small, then either 2 is close to zero or the correlation Corr(NegRec,Signal SH ) is close to zero. This suggests two possibilities.
The …rst possibility is that the shareholder's signal is su¢ ciently informative, so that she puts a non-zero weight on it: 2 is di¤erent from zero. The small omitted variable bias then implies that Corr(NegRec,Signal SH ) is close to zero. If ISS and shareholders acquire information about similar issues, the low correlation between the ISS recommendation and the informative signal Signal SH implies that the ISS recommendation must be relatively uninformative, consistent with critics'
concerns. The second possibility is that the shareholder's signal is not very informative, so that protection or coordination purposes, rather than for information. 34 The above argument assumes that there is only one shareholder in the …rm. suggests that either the ISS in-depth review is not very informative or that most shareholders do not perform independent research and simply follow ISS recommendations. This conclusion is similar to the conclusion from the comparison of OLS and RD estimates.
Conclusion
Proxy advisory …rms, and ISS in particular, have emerged as prominent players in the proxy voting process, but their role is highly controversial. Many market participants are concerned about the outsized in ‡uence ISS recommendations allegedly have on shareholder voting outcomes and call for increased regulation of proxy advisors. Others argue that stringent regulation can do more harm than good because the in ‡uence of proxy advisors is overstated: the strong correlation between ISS recommendations and shareholder votes could be due to ISS and shareholders relying on the same information and independently reaching the same conclusions.
In this paper, we analyze the e¤ect of ISS on voting outcomes by using exogenous variation in ISS recommendations due to a cuto¤ rule in the ISS voting guidelines. Speci…cally, when giving recommendations on say-on-pay proposals, ISS used to conduct an initial screen of …rms based on their one-and three-year TSRs and performed a deeper analysis of a …rm's compensation policies if both TSRs fell below certain industry-related cuto¤s. This rule leads to a discontinuous increase in the probability of a negative ISS recommendation for …rms just below the cuto¤. We therefore use a fuzzy regression discontinuity design to estimate the causal e¤ect of ISS recommendations on say-on-pay voting outcomes. We …nd that ISS has a strong e¤ect on shareholder votes: relative to positive recommendations, negative ISS recommendations reduce the percentage of votes in favor of say-on-pay proposals by about 25 percentage points. This e¤ect is robust to various speci…cations and bandwidths and suggests that contrary to frequent claims, the in ‡uence of ISS is not overstated.
Our …ndings contribute to the ongoing debate on the role and economic impact of proxy advisory …rms.
Figures and tables 
Density of MaxTSR
The …gure con…rms that companies do not manipulate their TSRs to push themselves above the ISS cuto¤ by showing that the density of the forcing variable is smooth around the cuto¤. The x-axis presents the forcing variable M axT SR, measured in percentage points, in a 5% bandwidth centered around the cuto¤. The y-axis corresponds to the density of M axT SR, measured in absolute values. The solid vertical line represents the cuto¤ M axT SR = 0. The …gure shows the histogram, estimated density, and 95% con…dence intervals of M axT SR in a 5% bandwidth around the cuto¤, generated using the code provided by J. McCrary on his website and based on McCrary (2008) . This subsample includes 403 observations. The absolute value of the corresponding test statistic is 0.84, which is not statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at any conventional level. 
Percent of Votes in Favor
The …gure shows that voting support on the sample of say-on-pay proposals in 2010-2011 exhibits no discontinuity around placebo cuto¤s M axT SR = c for c 2 f 3%; 3%; 5%; 5%g. For each c, the x-axis presents the forcing variable M axT SR, measured in percentage points, in a 5% bandwidth centered around the cuto¤ M axT SR = c. The y-axis corresponds to Votes, the percentage of votes in favor of the say-on-pay proposal, measured in percentage points. The dashed vertical line represents the cuto¤ M axT SR = c. Each dot represents the average percentage of votes in favor of the say-on-pay proposal in bins of 1%. The solid and dashed lines represent, respectively, the …tted values and 95% con…dence intervals of the regression of Votes on BelowCuto¤ c , M axT SR, and BelowCuto¤ c M axT SR, estimated on c 5% < M axT SR < c + 5%, where BelowCuto¤ c is the indicator variable that equals one if M axT SR < c and zero otherwise. This subsample includes 364, 453, 327, and 458 observations for c = 3%, 3%, 5%, and 5%, respectively. Variable de…nitions are provided in Appendix A. The table presents descriptive statistics for the sample of 1,932 companies and 2,020 say-on-pay proposals in 2010 and 2011. Panel A presents summary statistics (average, percentiles, and standard deviation) for the variables used in the study. Panel B presents voting outcomes depending on the ISS recommendation. Columns 2-6 of Panel B present summary statistics of the voting support for the subsample of "Against" recommendations, the subsample of "For" recommendations, and the whole sample. The next two columns present the number of observations with a given voting outcome (fail or pass) for a given ISS recommendation, where a proposal fails if it receives less than 50% support. The last column presents the total number of observations with a given ISS recommendation. Variable de…nitions are provided in Appendix A. The table shows that the probability of a negative ISS recommendation increases discontinuously if the company falls just below the ISS cuto¤ and corresponds to the …rst stage of the 2SLS procedure. All speci…cations are estimated on a 5% bandwidth around the cuto¤, i.e., on the interval 5% < M axT SR < 5%. The outcome variable is NegRec, the indicator variable that equals one if ISS gives a negative recommendation, and zero otherwise. The main variable of interest is BelowCuto¤ , which is an indicator variable that equals one if the …rm is below the ISS cuto¤ (M axT SR < 0), and zero otherwise. We estimate a linear probability model, and hence the coe¢ cient on BelowCuto¤ can be interpreted as the di¤erence in the probability of a negative ISS recommendation between …rms just below and just above the cuto¤. Variable de…nitions are provided in Appendix A. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The table shows that a negative ISS recommendation causes a signi…cant decline in voting support for say-on-pay proposals. The outcome variable is Votes, the percentage of votes in favor of a sayon-pay proposal, measured in percentage points. The main explanatory variable is NegRec, which equals one if ISS gives a negative recommendation, and zero otherwise. Estimation is conducted via 2SLS, where NegRec is the instrumented variable, the …rst stage is estimated in Table 2 , and the second stage is estimated in this table. The variable BelowCuto¤ equals one if the …rm is below the ISS cuto¤ (M axT SR < 0) and zero otherwise. The last three rows present the coe¢ cient and standard error on NegRec in an OLS regression of Votes on NegRec with the same set of regressors as in the corresponding 2SLS regression, and the p-value of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for equality of the OLS and IV estimates. All speci…cations are estimated on a 5% bandwidth around the cuto¤. Variable de…nitions are provided in Appendix A. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The table shows how the e¤ect of ISS on voting outcomes varies with the …rm's ownership structure. Model 1 considers the e¤ect of institutional ownership, and models 2 and 3 consider the e¤ect of institutional ownership concentration. Institutional ownership is de…ned as total institutional ownership in fraction of shares outstanding (instown_perc from Thomson Reuters 13F). Ownership concentration is measured by the institutional ownership Her…ndahl-Hirschman index, de…ned as the sum of squared share ownership over all institutional investors (the variable instown_hhi from Thomson Reuters 13F). We …rst restrict the sample to observations with M axT SR within a 10% bandwidth around the cuto¤ and calculate the median value of institutional ownership (ownership concentration) in the resulting sample. Next, we divide this sample into two subsamples, based on whether the …rm's institutional ownership (ownership concentration) falls below or above the median, and refer to the …rst and second subsample as the subsample of …rms with low and high institutional ownership (ownership concentration), respectively. We then repeat the 2SLS procedure on each of the two subsamples. Models 1 and 2 present the results for the linear speci…cation with regressors BelowCuto¤ , M axT SR, BelowCuto¤ M axT SR, and year and industry …xed e¤ects, and in model 3, we also control for the level of institutional ownership. Variable de…nitions are provided in Appendix A. *, **, and *** represent signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The table shows that the distribution of …rm characteristics is smooth around the cuto¤. For each …rm characteristic in the …rst column, column "RD coe¤. on BelowCuto¤"presents the results of a local linear regression of this characteristic on BelowCuto¤ , M axT SR, BelowCuto¤ M axT SR, and year and industry …xed e¤ects using a 5% bandwidth around the cuto¤. The estimated coe¢ cients on BelowCuto¤ are reported in the …rst row, and standard errors are reported in parentheses. Subsequent columns present the means of each …rm characteristic in two narrow intervals around the cuto¤: 5% < M axT SR < 0 and 0 < M axT SR < 5%, as well as the corresponding number of observations in these intervals. The table shows that the choice of the bandwidth and the degree of the fuzzy RD polynomial do not have a material e¤ect on the results of the paper. The …rst two rows in each panel present the estimate and standard error of the coe¢ cient on BelowCuto¤ in the …rst-stage regression, and the third and fourth rows present the estimate and standard error of the coe¢ cient on NegRec in the second-stage regression of the 2SLS procedure. Columns 1-9 present the results for the linear speci…cation corresponding to model 3 in Tables 2 and 3 (i.e., with regressors BelowCuto¤ , M axT SR, BelowCuto¤ M axT SR, and year and industry …xed e¤ects) on alternative bandwidths, ranging between 3% and 20%. In columns 10, 11, and 12, respectively, we estimate second, third, and fourth-order polynomial functions of the forcing variable M axT SR, allowing for di¤erent functional forms on the two sides of the cuto¤, on a 20% bandwidth around the cuto¤. For example, the regressors in column 10 include BelowCuto¤ , M axT SR, M axT SR 2 , BelowCuto¤ M axT SR, BelowCuto¤ M axT SR 2 , and year and industry …xed e¤ects. Variable de…nitions are provided in Appendix A. *, **, and *** represent signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The table examines the generalizability of the estimates to other …rms in the sample. Panel A presents the OLS estimates of the e¤ect of a negative ISS recommendation across various subsamples: the 5%, 10%, and 20% bandwidths around the cuto¤, the whole sample, and the subsamples to the left and to the right of the cuto¤. Panel B compares the distribution of …rm characteristics between the observations in the 5% bandwidth around the cuto¤ and the whole sample. Panel C shows how the e¤ect of ISS varies with the …rm's market-to-book ratio and size. We …rst restrict the sample to observations with M axT SR within a 10% bandwidth around the cuto¤ and calculate the median value of M/B (market capitalization) in the resulting sample. Next, we divide this sample into two subsamples, based on whether the …rm's M/B (market capitalization) falls below or above the median, and repeat the 2SLS procedure on each of the two subsamples. Institutional Ownership Concentration is the institutional ownership Her…ndahl-Hirschman index, de…ned as the sum of squared share ownership over all institutional investors. Other variable de…nitions are provided in Appendix A. *, **, and *** represent signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The table examines the generalizability of the estimates to 2012. Panel A shows that the distribution of shareholder votes and the probability of a negative ISS recommendation on say-on-pay proposals are similar between 2011 and 2012. Panel B presents the OLS estimates of the e¤ect of ISS estimated on a 5% bandwidth around the cuto¤. Variable de…nitions are provided in Appendix A. *, **, and *** represent signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Other variables

GMI Ratings
B. TSR cuto¤s from the ISS website
The following picture presents a screenshot from the ISS website: http://www.issgovernance.com/policygateway/industry-group-us-tsr-medians-performance-related-policy. It contains the list of ISS cuto¤s, i.e., one-and three-year median TSRs for each four-digit GICS group, downloaded at the end of the four most recent calendar quarters. (ISS provides these cuto¤s because it still uses them for some issues, e.g., CEOchairman separation.) We downloaded similar lists from the ISS website for most periods in our sample.
The following picture presents an expanded view of the last table above, with the TSRs downloaded on March 31, 2015.
C. Cross-validation procedure
To …nd the optimal bandwidth, we perform the following cross-validation procedure, as outlined in Imbens and Lemieux (2008).
1. First, we discard 50% of observations from the left tale on the left side of the cuto¤ and 50% of observations from the right tale on the right side of the cuto¤.
2. Then, for a given bandwidth h, we take the following steps.
(a) For each observation i to the right of the cuto¤ (M axT SR i > 0), we estimate a linear regression at M axT SR i , using observations within bandwidth h to the right of
(b) Similarly, for each observation i to the left of the cuto¤ (M axT SR i < 0), we estimate a linear regression at M axT SR i , using observations within bandwidth h to the left of 
3. The optimal bandwidth for the …rst-stage regression is then calculated as
4. We repeat steps 2-3 above, but for the outcome variable Votes. In particular, we replace N egRec by Votes in all equations of step 2 and …nd the corresponding optimal bandwidth as h opt 2 = arg min h CV V otes (h). 5. The optimal bandwidth, which should be used in the estimation of both the …rst and the second stage, is then given by h opt = min(h 
D. Analysis of positive ISS recommendations
In this section, we describe another test we perform to examine the informational role of ISS recommendations. This analysis leads to similar conclusions as the comparison between OLS and RD estimates in Section 6. Speci…cally, consider two …rms with a positive ISS recommendation and suppose that …rm A is just below the cuto¤ and …rm B is just above the cuto¤. The ISS rule implies that the positive recommendation for …rm A is based on an in-depth review, but the positive recommendation for …rm B is not (or less likely to be) and is given just because …rm B's TSR was above its industry median. Suppose that two assumptions hold: (1) the in-depth review by ISS is e¤ective at screening companies based on the quality of their compensation packages, and (2) many shareholders do their own independent research and get valuable information. Under these two assumptions, we would expect to see greater say-on-pay voting support for …rm A than for …rm B. Indeed, the …rst assumption implies that …rm A's compensation package must be better than …rm B's compensation package (both received a positive recommendation, but only …rm A went through ISS's in-depth review), and the second assumption implies that shareholders doing their own research identify these di¤erences between the two compensation packages and hence are more likely to vote favorably in …rm A.
We therefore focus on the subsample of observations with a positive ISS recommendation and estimate the regression Votes = 0 + 1 BelowCuto¤ + 2 M axT SR + 3 BelowCuto¤ M axT SR + X + " on a 5% bandwidth around the cuto¤. Table E.4 in Appendix E presents the results, with speci…cations 1-5 corresponding to those in Tables 2 and 3 . In all speci…cations, the coe¢ cient on BelowCuto¤ is insigni…cant and has the opposite (negative) sign from the positive sign predicted by the two assumptions above. The point estimate of 1 is about -2 percentage points with a standard error of 1.4. For comparison, the standard deviation of Votes in the subsample of …rms with a positive ISS recommendation is 7.0 percentage points (and is 6.6 percentage points in the 5% bandwidth within this subsample). Thus, the coe¢ cient on BelowCuto¤ is statistically and economically insigni…cant.
The insigni…cant di¤erence in voting support around the cuto¤ implies that one of the two assumptions above does not hold: either the ISS in-depth review does not screen companies very e¤ectively, or most shareholders do not perform careful independent research (and hence cannot distinguish between better and worse compensation packages that both get a positive ISS recommendation). Of course, it could also be that given the small sample size, the test does not have enough power to identify the predicted e¤ect.
To summarize, both the OLS-RD comparison and the analysis of positive ISS recommendations suggest that either few shareholders do independent research or that ISS recommendations are relatively uninformative. Unfortunately, our setting does not allow us to distinguish between these two possibilities (whether ISS recommendations are uninformative or whether few shareholders do independent research) and further research is needed. The table presents the …rst-stage regression for the sample of say-on-pay proposals in 2012, estimated on a 5% bandwidth around the cuto¤. The outcome variable is NegRec, which equals one if ISS gives a negative recommendation, and zero otherwise. Variable de…nitions are provided in Appendix A. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The table presents the …rst-stage regression for the sample of director elections. To match our main sample, we restrict attention to 2010 and 2011 and to those …rms in each year that had a say-on-pay proposal in that year, and aggregate the observations by …rm-year-recommendation. All speci…cations are estimated on a 5% bandwidth around the cuto¤. The outcome variable is NegRec, which equals one if ISS gives a negative recommendation, and zero otherwise. The main variable of interest is BelowCuto¤ , which equals one if the …rm is below the ISS cuto¤ (M axT SR < 0), and zero otherwise. Variable de…nitions are provided in Appendix A. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The table complements Table 5 and shows that the distribution of …rm characteristics is smooth around the cuto¤. For each …rm characteristic in the …rst column, column "RD coe¤. on BelowCuto¤"presents the results of a local linear regression of this characteristic on BelowCuto¤ , M axT SR, BelowCuto¤ M axT SR, and year and industry …xed e¤ects using a 5% bandwidth around the cuto¤. The estimated coe¢ cients on BelowCuto¤ are reported in the …rst row, and standard errors are reported in parentheses. Subsequent columns present the means of each …rm characteristic in two narrow intervals around the cuto¤: 5% < M axT SR < 0 and 0 < M axT SR < 5%, as well as the corresponding number of observations in these intervals. The table shows that voting outcomes for say-on-pay proposals with a positive ISS recommendation for companies just below and just above the ISS cuto¤ are not statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from each other. We …rst restrict the sample to observations with a positive ISS recommendation and then estimate all speci…cations on a 5% bandwidth around the cuto¤, i.e., on the interval 5% < M axT SR < 5%. The outcome variable is Votes, the percentage of votes in favor of a say-on-pay proposal, measured in percentage points. The main variable of interest is BelowCuto¤ , which is an indicator variable that equals one if the …rm is below the ISS cuto¤ (M axT SR < 0), and zero otherwise. The coe¢ cient on BelowCuto¤ can be interpreted as the di¤erence between voting support for …rms just below the cuto¤ and voting support for …rms just above the cuto¤, conditional on a positive ISS recommendation. Variable de…nitions are provided in Appendix A. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
E. Additional tables
